The Role of Schwedt Refinery "De-Russification" in NATO’s Eastern Security and Energy Transition
The "de-Russification" of the Schwedt Refinery could be crucial for securing NATO's eastern flank. Recent expert discussions reveal emerging threats in the West’s energy transition pathway.
The "Navigating NATO’s Energy Transition and Future Strategies" conference, hosted by the Emerging Futures Institute, offered a platform to examine fuel supply security in potential conflict zones. As Russian threats increase, there is potential to bolster preparedness through energy transition strategies.
Analysts emphasized that the energy sector could be Russia’s first target in the event of war. Recent Russian bombings of Ukraine's energy infrastructure evoke WWII-style strategic attacks. First, there’s a need for air defense investments to protect critical energy infrastructure. Second, even if Russia’s air installations are attacked, long-range strategic bomber attacks on Ukraine's energy facilities could persist.
In a wartime scenario, an electrified economy could face severe paralysis, as with electrified railways. This scenario underscores the value of keeping backup power systems fueled by fossil resources, such as diesel locomotives and small fuel depots at strategic sites. Diversifying energy sources and utilizing renewables wherever possible—even at frontline positions—could aid resilience, as Ukraine's experience suggests.
Beyond bombings, the power grid could face more sophisticated assaults. Russia lacks the capacity to destroy all targets and will likely choose selectively. As seen in Ukraine, targeted attacks on infrastructure elements like substations or power plant connections require years of expensive repairs and parts that often come with long wait times.
Personnel security also presents challenges, as staff may face coercion or bribery attempts to access facilities. Cyberattacks are also a known threat, with Western estimates attributing the loss of 4.5–6 GW of generation capacity in Ukraine to Russian actions—roughly equivalent to Denmark's entire power needs. Fortunately, Ukraine’s Soviet-era infrastructure design includes ample redundancy. Cold War-era standards for critical infrastructure access may offer guidance in developing similar resilience.
The West now faces a dilemma: securing surplus infrastructure where needed while advancing energy independence. For example, liquid fuels (not only fossil-based) will remain essential for military operations for decades. This calls for expanded refinery capacity and pipelines, especially within the Central European Pipeline System (CEPS) established during the Cold War. The most ambitious proposals envision NATO investing in its own refinery capacity as a contingency. Investments in renewables should also enhance resilience wherever possible, although achieving both will require billions of dollars. This has led to calls for mechanisms supporting private investment in energy security.
Renewable infrastructure vulnerability must also be considered, given reliance on Chinese technology and components and the potential for sabotage, such as with centralized offshore wind farms in the Baltic Sea. The prevalent economic model uses “cable pooling” to connect multiple turbines to a single cable, which may simplify tasks for potential saboteurs. Balancing economic and security needs in this sector will be essential. If these security adjustments significantly increase transition costs, cost-benefit analyses may warrant incorporating less expensive solutions, including fossil fuels.
Experts are considering safe energy transition standards, and the European Commission could play a pivotal role here, much like it did with USB-C adoption. The challenge is to retain elements of the old supply system—like refineries and pipelines vital to NATO’s eastern flank—while building the new: renewables, energy storage, synthetic fuels, and alternatives. At the same time, caution is needed to avoid repeating dependency mistakes with Russia by becoming reliant on China, which already dominates the renewables sector and is accused of exploiting the energy transition pioneered by Germany and other Western nations. The concept of “de-risking” and “decoupling” is gaining traction, as is considering how NATO might warn against threats such as Russia’s covert oil exports to the Schwedt Refinery via Kazakhstan or possibly Qatar.
Fuel supply infrastructure along NATO’s eastern flank must be secured regardless of the pace of the West’s energy transition. NATO’s Headquarters has already devised a plan to construct such infrastructure in the region, linking it to Western systems (including CEPS) while enabling military fuel supplies from multiple entry points across NATO’s eastern member states. According to Maciej Nowakowski of Esperis, this system, named the Eastern European Pipeline System (EEPS), aims to integrate Polish pipelines managed by PERN and Orlen with CEPS infrastructure from Germany and the Czech Republic.
Polish oil sector interests lean toward connecting NATO's eastern flank to the German market rather than the Czech market, although this would require financial support for new infrastructure development. This elevates the strategic importance of de-Russifying the Schwedt Refinery, a decision Germany has yet to finalize. A temporary management arrangement is in place until spring 2025, when Poland assumes the EU presidency. This moment could present a strategic opportunity for decisive action in the interest of the EU, NATO, and the West.